Louis Doulas


I’m a soon-to-be graduate student at Brandeis University working in philosophy. I’m interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, and aesthetics.


Abstract. Contra Locke’s thesis, Kit Fine (2000) argues (1) two things of the same sort may coincide, (2) two things of the same sort may coincide at each time they exist, and (3) two things of the same sort may necessarily coincide. We will challenge each one of these arguments in turn, ultimately demonstrating why the whole of Fine’s counter-example is incorrectly reasoned and that Locke’s thesis still stands.

Abstract. The most popular way to argue for the non-identity of a statue and the clay matter composing it, is to posit coincident entities, i.e., to say that statue and clay matter are numerically distinct coincident objects of the same ontological category, happening to share all the same parts at the same time. But, coincidence yields strange and untenable circumstances. How exactly can two objects exist, and be located in the exact same place at the exact same time? They can’t, or at least this is what we will argue. We motivate the claim that coincidence is neither legitimate or necessary for explaining the modal and sortal properties of clay matter and statue. We thus owe an explanation as to why and how these objects have seemingly distinct properties, yet remain non-coincident.

Abstract. In this paper I offer a medium-specific definition of painting that is (1) compatible with certain post-medium principles of Rosalind Krauss without (2) the formalistic positivism imposed by Greenbergian Modernism.