I’m a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Extending New Narratives in the History of Philosophy project at McGill University.
My research focuses on issues in epistemology, methodology, and the philosophy of science. I work on these issues both in the historical context of early analytic philosophy and in the context of present-day debates.
I received my PhD in Philosophy from the University of California, Irvine (June 2024), after completing an MA in Philosophy at Brandeis University. Before philosophy, I studied art (BFA, School of the Art Institute of Chicago) and then spent time in New York trying to make sense of what came to be known as post-internet art.
I’m also the Project Manager for the New Voices in the History of Philosophy podcast and a Production Assistant at the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.
Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) was a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy.
Our edited volume, the first to be devoted exclusively to Stebbing’s philosophy, aims to bring her back into focus, showing why she mattered then and why she matters now.
PDF (Introduction) •
OUP •
Amazon
I advance a new interpretation of G. E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World.” Drawing on unpublished archival material, I argue that “Proof” is best read as the culmination of Moore’s efforts to come to grips with an additional “fourth condition” on proof—beyond premise-conclusion distinctness, known premises, and validity. This interpretation clarifies both the seemingly paradoxical character of the proof and the unease it provokes in readers.
We argue that philosophy progresses much like science—despite deep disagreements—because many disputes remain evidence-responsive within shared intra-theoretical frameworks.
In Attitude in Philosophy, eds. S. Goldberg and M. Walker.
I raise two worries about Bergmann’s “autodidactic” method. I then use his view to highlight the limits of rational argument and contrast it with an alternative that also emphasizes the personal nature of philosophical inquiry while remaining more neutral regarding the rational standing of competing intuitions.
This is my contribution to a workshop on Michael Bergmann’s Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition held at Arizona State University on December 7, 2024.
I reexamine the relationship between Stebbing and Moore on common sense, showing that Stebbing’s account is both more distinct from and more indebted to Moore’s than scholars recognize. I argue that their key divergence lies in what I call Stebbing’s unity thesis—the view that common-sense and scientific knowledge form a genuine unity—yielding a dynamic position in which common-sense concepts may be clarified or revised by science, but not displaced wholesale.
In Susan Stebbing: Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy, eds. A. Coliva and L. Doulas.
We distinguish two ways in which one may be led to skepticism about philosophical knowledge. We then introduce an alternative, hinge-theoretic account that promises to recover philosophical knowledge while preserving optimism about philosophical progress.
In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, eds. M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter, and R. Rowland.
We argue that pervasive disagreement in philosophy—often taken to motivate skepticism about philosophical knowledge—can be reconciled with the possibility of such knowledge.
We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails; we then present a dilemma that exposes deeper problems in his argument.
I introduce the idea of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that have the status of Moorean certainties—and show how they complicate certain approaches to settling existence debates.